Part XII

World Bank calls it “success.” Maharashtra’s taxpayers call it “betrayal.”

X: @vivekbhavsar

A Closed Project, An Open Debt

On June 30, 2024, the World Bank officially declared the closure of the Project on Climate Resilient Agriculture (PoCRA) in Maharashtra. On paper, it was a glittering success. The World Bank’s Implementation Completion Report gave it a “Satisfactory” stamp. Outcomes achieved, women empowered, greenhouse gases reduced, and farmers reached.

But behind the rhetoric lies the bitter reality: Maharashtra’s taxpayers will continue to shoulder the burden of this loan for years to come. While the Bank walks away declaring success, the state is locked into repayments that stretch well beyond the project’s life.

This is the essence of Maharashtra’s World Bank loan trap — projects that are celebrated globally but turn into fiscal liabilities locally.

The Financial Trap

The financing plan was straightforward on paper:

• IBRD Loan Commitment: USD 420 million
• State Contribution: USD 179.55 million
• Total Project Cost: USD 599.55 million

Yet the way the money actually moved turned into a trap.

• 2018–2019: Barely USD 0.5–7 million was disbursed. Despite this, Maharashtra was already paying interest and fees.
• 2020–2021: Disbursements rose modestly (USD 4–21 million per tranche).
• 2022–2023: The floodgates opened. USD 17m, 23m, 31m, and 38m were disbursed in quick succession.
• 2024: The state drew another USD 37.5 million and USD 17.5 million in tranches.

And here is the catch:

• Repayments began in May 2024 — USD 10.95m principal — while Maharashtra was still drawing fresh loan funds.
• Interest ballooned from USD 0.5m in 2019 to USD 12.75m in 2024.

In other words, the state was borrowing, repaying, and paying interest all at once.

This is the classic debt trap design — frontloaded promises, backloaded costs.

Achievements Claimed vs Targets Missed

The World Bank’s narrative rests on selective achievements:

• Farmers Reached: 2.48 million (target: 1.32m) → “Exceeded.”
• Women’s Income Ratio: 1.11 to 1.12, marginally positive.
• Greenhouse Gas Reduction: Reported as a climate “win.”

But a closer look at the indicators tells a different story:

• Farm ponds & irrigation facilities: Target 83,900 hectares; achieved 30,375 hectares (36%).
• Farmers adopting improved technology: Target 1.27m; achieved 0.89m (70%).
• Water productivity index: Actual 0.23; target 0.45.
• Farm income for women-headed households: Target 1.50; achieved only 1.11.

Procurement performance was rated only “Moderately Satisfactory”. Yet the overall project was still rated “Satisfactory”.

For Maharashtra’s farmers, the reality was clear: the targets that mattered most to agricultural resilience — irrigation, productivity, and income — fell far short.

Climate Branding vs Ground Reality

The project was aggressively marketed under the banner of climate change.

• 95% tagged as “climate change.”
• 88% under “adaptation.”
• 59% water resource management.
• Only 6% under mitigation.

The Bank could showcase PoCRA globally as part of its climate financing portfolio. But in Maharashtra, the actual irrigation, mitigation, and productivity outcomes were weak.

The mismatch is stark: Maharashtra is saddled with debt, while the Bank collects climate credentials.

Politics Without Accountability

The debt story spans governments.

• 2018: Loan signed under Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis.
• 2020–2022: Continued under the MVA government (Shiv Sena, NCP, Congress).
• 2021–2024: The largest funds were drawn, amid political instability.
• December 2024: Fadnavis returns as Chief Minister — just as repayments start.

Both governments — the BJP and the MVA — signed off on the costs. Neither side raised serious concerns about interest escalation, delayed disbursement, or the overlap of repayment and borrowing.

Debt was bipartisan. Accountability was absent.

The Four Traps of PoCRA

1. Hidden Costs:Interest charges ballooned — USD 0.55m in 2019, USD 12.75m in 2024.
2. Delayed Utilisation:Funds were barely used for the first two years. Utilisation spiked only after 2021, compressing spending into the closing years.
3. Repayment Overlap:Repayments began in 2024 while disbursements and interest payments were still ongoing.
4. Satisfactory Mirage:Despite missed targets and weak procurement, the project was officially closed as “Satisfactory.”

This is not resilience — it is fiscal entrapment.

NABARD vs World Bank – The Road Not Taken

Why did Maharashtra choose an expensive World Bank loan when NABARD offers cheaper, rupee-denominated financing?

Officials argue that World Bank loans come with “global credibility” and “technical expertise.” But when interest alone costs USD 12 million in a year, that argument collapses.

NABARD loans would have been less costly, more flexible, and locally accountable. Instead, Maharashtra opted for international prestige and paid the price in hidden charges.

The Larger Pattern

PoCRA is not an isolated story. It is part of a repeating cycle in Maharashtra:

• Glossy contracts with international lenders.
• Minimal early utilisation, heavy disbursement in the final years.
• Ballooning interest and overlapping repayments.
• Projects stamped “Satisfactory” despite missed ground targets.

We saw this in Samruddhi Mahamarg, in irrigation projects, and now in climate agriculture.

The cycle is clear: what looks like “success” in Washington becomes fiscal liability in Mumbai.

The Politics of Accountability

The question is no longer about whether PoCRA worked. The numbers answer that.

The real question is: who will take responsibility?

• Who approved the back-loaded disbursement that spiked interest costs?
• Why did repayments begin before funds were fully used?
• Why were irrigation and productivity targets missed?
• Why was NABARD ignored in favour of costlier IBRD loans?
• Why was procurement tolerated despite being only “Moderately Satisfactory”?

Until Maharashtra fixes political and bureaucratic accountability, such traps will continue.

Betrayal of the Taxpayer

The World Bank closes its books on PoCRA as a “Satisfactory” success. Maharashtra’s farmers and taxpayers inherit the bill: USD 420 million in loans, USD 179 million in state spending, and interest charges that peaked at USD 12.75 million in a single year.

This is the essence of the loan trap.

World Bank calls it a success. Maharashtra’s taxpayers call it betrayal.

Also Read: Maharashtra’s World Bank Loan Trap: Hidden Costs Bleeding the State

Also Read: Maharashtra’s World Bank Loan Trap: The True Cost of Borrowing

Also Read: Maharashtra’s World Bank Loan Trap: Case Studies of Costly Projects

Also Read: Maharashtra’s World Bank Loan Trap: The Escalation Over Two Decades

Also Read: Maharashtra’s World Bank Loan Trap: Policy Questions & The Way Forward

Also Read: Maharashtra’s World Bank Loan Trap: “Climate Project or Cash Drain?”

Also Read: Maharashtra’s World Bank Loan Trap: Paying for Nothing

Also Read: Maharashtra’s World Bank Loan Trap: The All-In Cost

Also Read: Maharashtra’s World Bank Loan Trap: The Fine Print That Bled the State

Also Read: Maharashtra’s World Bank Loan Trap: What Delhi Admitted

Also Read: Maharashtra’s World Bank Loan Trap – Debt Dressed as Development