Why global institutions struggle when powerful states are part of the conflict

By Aditya Alex | Global Affairs Contributor

Nottingham, England: On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several senior military officials. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks on Israel, US military bases across the Gulf, and Arab states hosting American forces. Within days, the conflict spread across nearly a dozen countries.

Forty days later, on 7 April, a two-week ceasefire was announced through Pakistani mediation following bilateral negotiations between Washington and Tehran, with the UN Secretary-General issuing a welcome statement after the fact. During those forty days, the UN Security Council passed one resolution. It condemned Iran’s conduct. It did not address the strikes that triggered the war.

Resolution 2817

The Security Council met in emergency session on 28 February, hours after the initial strikes. Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the escalation risked triggering “a chain of events that nobody can control.” Several delegations called for restraint, but no resolution was adopted that day. On 12 March, the Council adopted Resolution 2817, co-sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council and 135 member states. The resolution condemned Iran’s attacks on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, and called for an immediate halt to hostilities. Thirteen of fifteen Council members voted in favour, while China and Russia abstained. A competing Russian draft that addressed the initial US-Israeli offensive failed to secure passage.

During the debate, Colombia’s representative stated that no state has the right to attack another to implement regime change. Iran’s delegate described the resolution as a distortion that excluded the broader context of the conflict. The International Atomic Energy Agency had assessed prior to the escalation that there was no evidence of an active nuclear weapons programme in Iran at the time. None of these positions were reflected in the final text. At the time of the vote, the United States held the rotating presidency of the Council.

Subsequent efforts to address maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz also stalled. A separate Gulf-backed resolution failed after vetoes from China and Russia, and a proposed UN-led mechanism to secure shipping routes was never adopted. The strait was eventually reopened as part of the Pakistan-brokered ceasefire.

The Veto Constraint

The outcome reflects a structural reality rather than an isolated breakdown. The Security Council’s design limits what it can produce in conflicts involving major powers or their close allies. Each of the five permanent members holds veto authority over substantive resolutions. In practice, when a permanent member is directly involved in a conflict, or strongly aligned with one of the parties, Council action tends to narrow to what that member is willing to accept.

This pattern has precedent. The Council neither authorised nor formally condemned the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It has remained divided on Ukraine since 2022. During the Syria conflict, competing vetoes prevented unified action even as the war escalated. In such cases, the Council often produces resolutions that reflect the balance of power within it, rather than an independent adjudication of events on the ground.

When Diplomacy Moves Elsewhere

The ceasefire reflected this limitation. It emerged not through multilateral negotiation within the UN framework, but through bilateral engagement mediated by Pakistan, which maintained channels with both Washington and Tehran. The agreement was announced by President Donald Trump on 7 April, with follow-up talks scheduled in Islamabad. By the time the UN formally responded, the political outcome had already been shaped elsewhere. This suggests that, in high-intensity conflicts involving major powers, decisive diplomatic outcomes are often negotiated outside institutional structures.

The Humanitarian Role

While the Security Council remained constrained, the wider UN system was engaged in a different capacity. By mid-March, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that up to 3.2 million people had been displaced within Iran, with over a million more displaced in Lebanon. Iran’s health authorities reported more than 1,500 fatalities and 18,000 injuries by late March, while regional estimates placed the total death toll at approximately 2,700.

UN human rights monitors documented civilian casualties and damage to hospitals, schools, and residential infrastructure across multiple locations. The Secretary-General maintained contact with relevant governments while UN agencies coordinated humanitarian responses in a region already hosting millions of displaced people prior to the conflict. This work, spanning documentation, coordination, and humanitarian relief, remains one of the UN’s most consistent and operationally effective functions.

A Structural Question

The conflict places renewed focus on a foundational assumption underlying international institutions: that states, having agreed to a rules-based framework, will accept some degree of constraint on their own conduct. In practice, however, powerful states often operate within that framework selectively. Both the United States and Iran invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter to justify their actions, even as the Council was unable to produce a unified response addressing the full scope of the conflict.

The question that emerges is not whether the UN “failed” in this instance, but whether expectations of its role have outpaced its design. When conflicts involve states with the capacity and willingness to act independently, institutional mechanisms tend to function more as forums for debate than mechanisms of enforcement.

Between Expectation and Reality

The UN continues to perform essential roles in humanitarian coordination, documentation, and international visibility. These functions are real and, in some cases, irreplaceable. But they operate within a narrower space than the Charter’s original vision of collective security might suggest. The gap between expectation and institutional capacity has become more visible in recent conflicts. Whether that gap reflects a need for reform or a recognition of structural limits is a question that remains open, and the current conflict has made it harder to set aside.

Author Bio

Aditya Alex holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from the University of Nottingham. His work focuses on global trade politics, geopolitical risk, and strategic balancing in a multipolar world.

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