Military strategy is the hand-maiden of politics and debacle of 1962, was basically a political failure

Mumbai: One of the single and biggest criticisms of pursuing the ‘Forward Policy’ of forcing the Chinese out of the areas belonging to India was that both the political and military establishments shared a seriously flawed view.

“The so-called ‘Forward Policy’, therefore, appears fully justified. But it went too far, got too reckless, and lost its balance in its later stages.”

The original letter of Forward Policy had laid down that firing incident was to be avoided at all cost. As tensions increased on the border, the only concession made was that troops were permitted to fire in self defence.

The net result was that every time a skirmish took place with the Chinese, the Indian Army jawan’s waited for the orders from above. The non-military deployment of the troops could leave no one in doubt about the eventual outcome of the war.

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“Military strategy, however, is always and quite rightly, the hand-maiden of politics. And the debacle of 1962 was basically a political failure. The political factors, therefore, deserve close attention”, states the Col Athale report.

The Intelligence Bureau (IB) believed that China won’t attack even if they wanted to. The political leadership, too, shared the Army’s assessment that whatever be the situation, China was not likely to launch a big attack on India. Wishful thinking was that China would draw back from the brink of war if India put up a brave front.

Committed to battle piecemeal. Commanders used same tactics in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48 without realising that the fight was not against raiders, but against the professional army of one of the major military powers of the world.

Army chief Brij Mohan Kaul had called for setting up more Indian posts, whereas the Western Command wanted strengthening of the existing posts. “India was in no position militarily even to defend what it had. Lieutenant General Daulat Singh advocated halting of the Forward Policy till India was militarily in a strong position. After the virtual breakdown of talks the Forward Policy became full of risks.

Everything ranging from ammunition and food to defence stores was in short supply. There were obvious lacunae in planning in Artic conditions of Ladakh, where the men had to perforce use of ordinary canvas tents, for living and surviving. Jawan’s wore cotton clothing and canvas shoes. Nearly, equal number of casualties suffered by the Indians was weather related casualties.

According to the report, Indian troops facing the Chinese onslaught faced/suffered several handicaps, some of which were – (i). Obsolete weapons unsuitable for warfare in mountains, and that too in short supply, (ii). Lack of winter clothing/shoes etc and (iii). Absence of a road network which made line of communication difficult.

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Intelligence or the lack of it (both in a general and particular sense) made matters worse. The estimates of forward troops were dismissed as exaggeration. “Instead of presenting intelligence, the IB recommended and advised the Army on military matters”, says the report.

In one of his communications of June 25 and June 26, 1962, Army Chief B M Kaul even went to the extent of terming the dispatches from the battalion commanders (of Corp XV and Western Command) were acting like post offices and just forwarding the complaints from below.

The Chinese made the Tsang Jong incident in Aksai Chin area as an excuse, unleashed a well-planned and pre-meditated war on India in both the Eastern and Western sectors. In trying to defend every inch the Indians ended up losing much more that they need have.

Except for the field commanders, the Army top brass including Lieutenant General P N Thapar, L P Sen, B M Kaul, Major General J S Dhillon and Brigadier D K Palit believed that China might not react strongly and the operations to evict the Chinese from the Thag La Ridge (Ladakh region) would be carried through successfully. To make matters worse the Army did not carry out joint planning of operations. Chiefs of the three services never met to discuss the developing situation on the border during the operations.

The massive retaliation by Chinese at Namkha Chu left Army Chief B M Kaul totally bewildered. “The Army top brass believed that the Chinese would not react strongly. Worse still, their belief permeated into the lower echelons of the Army, with the result that even field formations became complacent”, said the report.

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Operation Leghorn (Aksai Chin and NEFA) was launched when the Indian Army was hopelessly unprepared both physically and mentally, to meet the enemy who was thoroughly prepared militarily and was just looking for a pretext for a showdown. The die was thus cast for a political gamble by India without adequate military means to back it up. In Operation Leghorn Indian troops were asked not to call the Chinese ‘enemy’ and, while doing bayonet practice, they were not allowed to use Chinese dummies.

Just days before the start of actual hostilities, on October 4, 1962, Lt Gen B M Kaul took over charge as Commander of IV Corps (earlier 23 Corps) headed by Lt Gen Umrao Singh. At the height of the war, Lieutenant General B M Kaul was replaced by Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh on October 24. Barely within five days he (Harbaksh Singh) was replaced again by Lt Gen B M Kaul on October 29, 1962 and General Officer Commanding (GoC) of Corp IV. Lt Gen B M Kaul was allowed to command his Corps from his sick bed in distant Delhi at a critical time.