Mumbai: Despite the air superiority in terms of fighter planes and bombers over China, advice given by Air headquarters in 1962 was pessimistic and was plagued by the advice given then US Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith which was crucial and negative. India had the edge in the air. Chinese air force was virtually grounded due to dispute with Soviet Union and spares were short. The non-utilisation of Indian Air Force (IAF) in combat role during the 1962 operations was another strategic blunder, states Col. Athale’s report of 1992.
It was John Kenneth Galbraith who had then suggested to the Indians not to use Air Force. India did not use its Indian Air Force in the war as it was told by the United States of America (USA) and Russia that they could not help India as they were busy with the Cuban missile crisis and the Bay of Pigs operation.
The impression given was that India had vintage World War II airplanes left behind by British after Independence and that China had better planes that could reach as far as then Madras (Chennai).
The only drawback there was, it was with the transport fleet which had piston engine aircrafts like Dakotas, Packet C-119 and Russian made Illushin-14. Their operational height was 4,500 meters, whereas the height of some Himalayan peaks was 5,500 meters.
These aircrafts were not pressurised and the pilots besides wearing bulky clothing had to carry oxygen cylinders and take a lengthy detour to avoid the Himalayan peaks. Another drawback was that these aircrafts could not take off from Leh, Kargil, Chushul, Thoise, Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), Walong, Along and Tezu (in NEFA). High altitude meant that these aircrafts needed long runways and had to carry reduced payload. Most of the time air-dropped supplies landed in the hands of the enemy.
During the entire 1962 war both IAF and Indian Navy remained out of combat action. Use of air power by India could have favourably influenced the course of events during the 1962 war. Comparatively, IAF was better equipped with better and more modern aircrafts like Hunters, Mysteres and Canberra bombers. Soviets later did help by giving AN-12 and MI4’s to India.
China faced problems in terms of infrastructure in Tibet and also did not have mid-air refueling capability. Indian airfields on the other hand were located at sea level and faced none of the disadvantages faced by the Chinese.
Moreover, Chinese airfields were so far away from the battle zone that aircraft had to operate at extreme ranges with reduced weapons load. The IAF on the other hand could dominate the entire battle zone from comparatively close-by air bases, and with better and more modern war planes.
Hence, it was felt that use of air power by India could have favourably influenced the course of events. IV Corps as well as the Western Command had requested for offensive air support, which was turned down. With just two to three airfields in operation in Tibet and with meager infrastructure the Chinese were not capable of either countering the IAF or posing a worthwhile threat to cities in the plains.
However, the terrain of Ladakh did present its own set of problems En-route to Sonmarg one can hardly find any trees after Kargil and Khalsi. Oxygen levels in the atmosphere drop by 30 percent. Humans and vehicles both face problems in this inhospitable climate.
Height of some ranges in the Karakoram mountains and passes range between 17,000 to 20,000 feet on the eastern side of Aksai Chin. The terrain on the Chinese side was suited for road construction. On the Indian side only the Chushul garrison had a jeepable road. Hence, air dropping of supplies was the only option for the IAF. Given the terrain and inclement weather, hardly one sortie was possible at times.
In order to avoid the enemy and the high peaks the aircrafts had to take a longer route which led to monotony and fatigue. The area then did not have any radars and communication was only possible through radio contact. The lack of use of combat air power was more acutely felt in the loss of Tawang and humiliating defeat at Namkha Chu.
