Thiruvananthapuram: Close to three decades, it has become a practice for the BJP in Kerala to install its newly-appointed state chief with pomp and fanfare, accompanied by loud assertions of an imminent electoral breakthrough. Despite trying out new faces every now and then, the party’s electoral fortune has remained the same in Kerala’s duopoly dominated by coalitions led by the CPI(M) and Congress. In both the well-established formations politically and socially well- knit Muslim and Christian communities are deciding factors.
The listless cliché was repeated recently as young and firebrand K Surendran took over as the BJP state president. A rabble rouser himself, Surendran was handpicked by the central leadership for the job after the faction-riven state unit remained rudderless for several months.
Surendran’s immediate predecessor P Sreedharan Pillai was made governor of Mizoram shortly after the party’s failure to end the long-drawn electoral jinx in 2019 Lok Sabha polls. Ironically, the vacancy in the Raj Bhavan at Aizwal that Pillai filled was left by resignation of Kummanam Rajasekharan on the eve of the LS polls, to be fielded as the party’s best bet in Thiruvananthapuram parliament seat. After raising the hope through a spirited campaign, he too bit the dust finishing a distant runner-up to Congress’s Shashi Tharoor. The defeat of Rajaseskharan, a former state unit chief and confidante of the RSS, further fueled factionalism and ego tussle in BJP in Kerala. Obviously, Pillai’s elevation as governor was seen as a ruse to keep him away from the state rather than rewarding him for his services to the party.
In run-up to 2019 LS polls, the mood in the BJP was upbeat as the party was brimming with hope that it would reap benefits out of the campaign it spearheaded over entry of women in 10-50 age group to the famed Sabarimala Ayyappa shrine. The party, with the support of the Sangh parivar outfits, had organized a prolonged campaign against the LDF Government’s alleged move to break the long-held tradition by allowing women of all ages to the hill temple in the wake of a Supreme Court order to that effect. The campaign was marked by huge participation of members of the majority community, including women, in the length and breadth of the state. The BJP leaders had hoped that this upsurge could be translated into an electoral triumph at least in a couple of LS seats. To the great disappointment of the state leaders, the electorate belied their hopes. At the end of the end of the day, the Congress-led UDF turned out to be the beneficiary of the commotions over Sabarimala Temple.
The tragedy of BJP in Kerala is that electoral benefits have consistently eluded it despite being a well-built organization packed with ready-to-work-hard rank and file and loyal support base. The party has units in the length and breadth of the state, painstakingly built since the Jana Sangh days by the selfless work of dedicated forerunners, many of them assignees from RSS. Going by its membership count and support network, it easily is Kerala’s third largest party, after the CPIM(M) and the Congress. It far outnumbers the regional and splinter entities that have been in and out of power as partners of either of the two central coalitions. In more recent times, BJP, along with Parivar affiliates, has raised labour and service wings across the sectors.
In spite of being a well-built organization, BJP has never been able to win a single LS seat from the state so far. As a belated consolation it won a lone seat in 2016 assembly polls. However, refusing to be disheartened by the unending electoral drought, BJP has been an active presence in the assembly and parliament polls in Kerala, steadily increasing its vole share, which touched 15.60 per cent in 2019 LS polls.
It is not far to seek for the fundamental reason for the party’s failure in the electoral arena. Its hope of a breakthrough at the hustings has dashed essentially against the demographic profile of Kerala, where the minority communities account over 40 per cent of the population. There are two ways the party could overcome this stumbling block. First, it should win the overwhelming support of the entire Hindu community. A second escape-route for the party is to gain the confidence of at least a section of the minorities. Both the options are hard to achieve in the near future. The so-called ‘social engineering’ the party has successfully tried in the northern states has floundered in Kerala.
Consider the first option of weaning away the majority of Hindus from other parties. The Hindus, of all castes including OBCs and Dalits, form the major segment of both the CPI(M) and the Congress in Kerala. As coalition leaders, they also have the additional advantage of enjoying the support of sections of the minorities, though their loyalty has to either of the front shifted from situation to situation. The state’s regional outfits like Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) and Kerala Congress factions are part of either of the two coalition. This has guaranteed them a share in power. This hard-to-break scenario makes it clear that the BJP, to emerge as a mighty electoral force, has to shake and break the CPI(M) and the Congress, and win the loyalty of their supporters in large numbers. The party’s political programme and strategy are not potent to unleash such an upheaval.
Now come to the second option of winning the confidence of the minorities. The BJP is primarily a ‘Hindu party’, a reality that even the state leaders do not want to deny. Though the party has made overtures to the Christian establishments and individuals and made some isolated inductions into its leadership rungs, such moves have failed to bring any substantial benefit. So long as the minority trust deficit remains, it will be hard for the party to pull off an electoral breakthrough in the foreseeable future.
