New Delhi: India’s infrastructure challenge has not always been about whether there are enough roads, railways, ports or airports. A bigger problem has often been how well these networks work together. When different ministries and agencies plan infrastructure separately, gaps can emerge between modes of transport, projects can overlap, and delays can add up. For businesses, these coordination problems eventually translate into higher logistics costs, longer transit times and less predictable supply chains. The issue becomes even more important as India seeks to strengthen its position as a manufacturing and export hub and integrate further into global value chains. Good infrastructure alone is not enough to make Indian businesses competitive. A factory may have a road to a port, for instance, but if cargo gets held up at a poorly connected rail terminal, warehouse or last-mile link, the efficiency gained from the infrastructure is quickly lost.
It was against this backdrop that the government launched the PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan in October 2021. Rather than focusing on another individual infrastructure programme, Gati Shakti was designed around a broader idea: bringing different infrastructure plans onto a common platform so that ministries and states could coordinate their projects more effectively. Its geospatial platform allows agencies to view existing and planned infrastructure together, with the aim of identifying gaps and improving multimodal connectivity. The framework is built around ideas such as comprehensiveness, prioritisation, optimisation and synchronisation, explicitly attempting to overcome departmental silos.
The government points to integrated project planning, greater data sharing and multimodal connectivity as signs of progress. As of August 2025, the Network Planning Group had evaluated 293 infrastructure projects worth ₹13.59 lakh crore. More recently, a DPIIT-NCAER assessment estimated India’s logistics costs at 7.97% of GDP in 2023–24. But neither figure, on its own, answers the more difficult question: have these changes actually made the movement of goods faster and cheaper, and how much of that improvement can be attributed to Gati Shakti? A lower logistics-cost estimate or faster infrastructure execution cannot automatically be treated as evidence that Gati Shakti caused the improvement. India has simultaneously implemented several other interventions, including Dedicated Freight Corridors, Bharatmala, Sagarmala, ULIP, logistics reforms and highway and port expansion, making attribution difficult. The DPIIT-NCAER assessment itself recognises the role of multiple initiatives in shaping logistics performance.
Has Gati Shakti Reduced Logistics Costs?
India’s logistics costs were estimated to have declined by 0.8–0.9 percentage points of GDP between FY2014 and FY2022, according to an NCAER study cited in the Economic Survey 2023–24. However, this period covers several major reforms and infrastructure investments, including GST, highway expansion and the development of Dedicated Freight Corridors, making it difficult to isolate the contribution of any single initiative. The latest DPIIT-NCAER assessment estimates India’s logistics costs at 7.97% of GDP in 2023–24. This figure should, however, be treated cautiously when compared with earlier estimates of 13–14%. The earlier figures were based on different methodologies and datasets, while the newer estimate uses a more systematic framework combining official datasets with primary information from more than 3,500 industry stakeholders. The difference between the estimates therefore cannot simply be interpreted as a reduction of five or six percentage points in logistics costs.
The 7.97% estimate nevertheless provides a more systematic basis for assessing India’s logistics system. The more difficult question is what has driven the improvement. Gati Shakti was launched only in October 2021, while several of the infrastructure and policy changes contributing to improved logistics performance were already underway. Dedicated Freight Corridors, Bharatmala, Sagarmala, GST, highway and port expansion, and digital logistics initiatives such as ULIP have all influenced how goods move across the country. Gati Shakti’s contribution is therefore more likely to be indirect. Its purpose is to improve the coordination of these investments by bringing infrastructure plans across ministries and transport modes onto a common platform. Better alignment can help identify missing links, reduce duplication and improve connections between road, rail, ports and logistics facilities. But a fall in aggregate logistics costs cannot, by itself, establish that Gati Shakti caused the improvement. The available evidence therefore supports a more cautious conclusion. India’s logistics performance has improved, but the extent to which those gains can be attributed specifically to PM Gati Shakti remains difficult to measure. The stronger test is whether the framework can translate better planning into measurable improvements in freight movement, transit times, port turnaround and the utilisation of multimodal infrastructure.
From Planning to Project Execution
Gati Shakti’s impact cannot be judged only by the number of projects reviewed or infrastructure gaps identified. One of its central aims was to change how projects are planned and executed by bringing different ministries and agencies onto a common platform. The National Master Plan has identified 156 first- and last-mile infrastructure gaps across sectors including coal, steel, fertiliser, ports and food distribution. There are also signs that the framework is moving beyond planning into project sanction and execution. According to the Ministry of Railways, 300 railway projects covering 13,808 km were sanctioned under the PM Gati Shakti framework during the period reported up to March 2026. The projects include new lines, gauge conversions and doubling works.
These figures provide stronger evidence of implementation than simply counting projects mapped onto the platform. At the same time, sanctioning a project under the Gati Shakti framework does not necessarily mean that the project itself was originally conceived after the launch of the National Master Plan, nor does it establish that businesses are already seeing the resulting benefits. The relevant question is whether these projects are closing previously identified connectivity gaps and producing measurable improvements in freight movement, transit times and multimodal connectivity. Gati Shakti appears to have strengthened the institutional process through which infrastructure projects are identified, aligned and prioritised. Whether this translates into consistently lower logistics costs and greater efficiency for businesses will depend on how effectively the resulting infrastructure is integrated into the wider transport network.
The Multimodal Connectivity Test
Gati Shakti is ultimately meant to make different modes of transport work together, making multimodal connectivity a more direct test of its effectiveness than the number of projects reviewed. The Dedicated Freight Corridors provide one measurable example. By March 2025, 2,741 km, or 96.4% of the combined Eastern and Western DFCs, had been commissioned. The corridors have increased dedicated freight capacity and helped shift traffic away from the conventional railway network. However, these gains cannot be attributed to Gati Shakti alone, as the DFCs were planned before the National Master Plan was launched. There have also been improvements at India’s ports. Average turnaround time at major ports fell from 52.87 hours in 2021–22 to 48.84 hours in 2025–26. These figures indicate improving port efficiency, although the gains also reflect measures such as port modernisation, mechanisation, capacity expansion and changes in operating procedures.
Port connectivity provides a more direct test of Gati Shakti’s coordination role. The Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, in consultation with the Ministry of Railways and the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, has identified 294 rail and road connectivity projects for ports. Of these, 84 have been completed, 66 are under implementation and 144 remain at the planning stage. The figures show progress, but also highlight the gap between identifying connectivity requirements and completing them. The same issue applies to Multimodal Logistics Parks. The government has identified a network of such facilities, but their economic impact will depend not simply on approval or construction, but on whether they become operational, attract cargo and effectively connect road, rail and warehousing networks.
The Unified Logistics Interface Platform represents the digital side of this integration, bringing information from different logistics systems onto a common platform. However, digital and physical integration are not the same thing. Better visibility of cargo cannot compensate for poor roads, inadequate rail connectivity or weak last-mile infrastructure. Overall, the evidence points to improving freight and port performance, but much of this improvement comes from individual infrastructure investments and reforms. Gati Shakti’s more difficult test is whether its coordination function can make these investments work together as a single logistics network.
Where the Bottlenecks Remain
Even as major transport corridors and ports have improved, last-mile connectivity remains a relatively weak link in India’s logistics network. The latest DPIIT-NCAER assessment finds that smaller firms face significantly higher logistics costs, highlighting that improvements in the national logistics system do not necessarily translate into equal gains for businesses of different sizes. The problem is particularly visible at the points where different modes meet. A shipment may move efficiently along a highway or freight corridor but still face delays or additional handling costs when it reaches a warehouse, terminal or local road. Moving goods between road, rail, ports and inland logistics centres involves handling, warehousing and transshipment, all of which can add time and cost. There are also significant differences across states and regions. Improvements along major national corridors do not necessarily mean that the entire logistics network is operating at the same level. Local roads, access to terminals, warehousing capacity and state-level implementation can determine whether the benefits of large infrastructure investments actually reach businesses.
The implication for Gati Shakti is important. Better coordination at the national level can help identify infrastructure gaps, but closing those gaps still depends on state-level execution, local connectivity and the effective use of logistics facilities. The question is therefore not only whether India is building better-connected corridors, but whether those improvements reach smaller firms and less-connected regions that remain outside the main logistics networks. Implementation remains a challenge as well. Infrastructure projects are still subject to land acquisition, environmental and other regulatory clearances, financing constraints and coordination with state governments. These are not necessarily issues that a common planning platform can solve by itself. The distinction between planning, completion and utilisation is therefore important. An identified, approved or even completed project does not by itself generate economic benefits unless it is connected to the wider network and actually put to use. For Gati Shakti, the task is to ensure that coordination achieved at the planning stage translates into effective execution and ultimately reaches the businesses and supply chains that the framework is intended to make more efficient.
The Attribution Problem
India’s logistics performance has improved during a period when several major infrastructure and policy initiatives were implemented simultaneously. Dedicated Freight Corridors, Bharatmala, Sagarmala, GST, ULIP and other logistics reforms have all affected the cost and movement of goods. This makes it difficult to determine how much of the improvement can be attributed specifically to PM Gati Shakti. This is particularly important because Gati Shakti differs from many of the programmes it coordinates. It is primarily a planning and coordination framework, rather than an infrastructure project that directly produces a measurable freight or cost outcome. Its contribution is therefore more likely to come through better alignment of projects, identification of missing links and coordination between ministries and modes of transport. Yet the difficulty of isolating its individual contribution should not mean that the role of the framework is dismissed. Coordination has value in itself, particularly in a system where the success of one infrastructure investment can depend heavily on the actions of another ministry or agency. A well-developed railway line, for example, is of limited use if it does not connect efficiently with the road network, a port or an industrial area.
The evidence examined here suggests that India has made measurable progress in areas such as port efficiency, freight infrastructure and connectivity planning. What remains difficult to establish is how much of that improvement can be attributed specifically to Gati Shakti. Demonstrating its independent impact will require longer-term evidence linking coordination under the platform with changes in transit times, project delivery, multimodal utilisation and logistics costs.
Conclusion
PM Gati Shakti has strengthened coordination among different projects, agencies and departments, addressing a key weakness in India’s infrastructure planning. There are early indications of improvements in project appraisal, connectivity planning and multimodal coordination, even though India’s broader logistics performance cannot be attributed to Gati Shakti alone. Its real test now lies beyond the planning platform. If improved coordination results in faster project execution, smoother multimodal movement and lower logistics costs, Gati Shakti will have demonstrated its broader economic value. For now, the framework has strengthened how India plans infrastructure; whether it can make that infrastructure work more efficiently on the ground remains the more important test.
