Offensive defence of Nov 14, 1962 – the assault so launched not only failed, but it boomeranged

Mumbai: The ‘Offensive Defence’ plan that was launched in the Walong sector of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh) led to the collapse of the front. “It was ordered to be completed on November 14, 1962 so as to make it a gift to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on his birthday. The assault so launched not only failed, but it boomeranged”, state Dr P B Sinha and Col. A A Athale in their 1992 report of ‘Official History of the conflict with China, 1962’.

The Chinese offensive started on October 20, 1962, all along the Sino-Indian border. By October 24, the Chinese had eliminated Indian check-posts in Chip-Chap valley, Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), Galwan and Indus valley sectors. Chinese had eliminated Indian presence in Galwan valley. In the east they had captured Towang and had reached the northern banks of Towang Chu.

In NEFA, the Chinese had entered so deep that, for a moment, before defenses could be re-organised, nothing stood between the Chinese and the oil fields of Digboi and Tinsukia (Assam). Had it not been for the Chinese unilaterally declaring ceasefire on November 21, 1962.

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At the tactical level, while Tawang was lost due to the blunder of pushing up 7 Infantry Brigade to the Namkha Chu, the humiliating debacle on the Sela-Dirang-Bomdila front was caused entirely by the failure of the military commanders on the spot. Major General A S Pathania and Lieutenant General Brij Mohan Kaul share the maximum blame.

But Lieutenant General Pran Nath Thapar and Lieutenant General L P Sen were also guilty of abdicating their responsibility, by refusing to issue orders to Pathania when Kaul was not available at the Corps Headquarters. But regarding eastern Ladakh in particular, it is difficult to think up any viable strategy to save it once the Chinese had stolen a march in logistics by quietly building the road through Aksai Chin.

India hurriedly put up posts without backing by supply bases and reinforcements. Government of India (GoI) and Army Headquarters did not review changes in ground realities as China began encircling Indian posts. It was difficult to push the Chinese back as they were in a much stronger position in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Armed forces were short of equipment and stores. Policy to consolidate the areas already in possession was not implemented.

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In Tibet, as against the Chinese troops, Indian soldiers were neither trained nor equipped for operations as such heights. “In fact, India did not possess any military option in Tibet at the time due to logistical difficulties. In Ladakh and NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) where Intelligence Bureau (IB) had sprinkling of staff, the entire staff for border posts in the central sector was drawn from state police”, states the report in a damning indictment.

In Namkha Chu, the Rajputs suffered the most. The Chinese had encircled the Indian posts. In many cases, entire platoons were wiped out in Tsangdhar ridge and Khinzemane at the foot of Thagla ridge.

After commencing the military offensive between October 22 and October 23, 1962, China adopted Korean War strategy in Tawang. It used time to replenish, regroup back to adequate strength and then make further push towards a new objective, to gain time for their troops to regroup themselves and made necessary before announcing fresh attacks.

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On October 24, 1962, Premier Chou En-lai made an offer to Prime Minister Nehru of “friendly settlement” of the boundary question, conditions stipulated meant that it was bound to be rejected. But this exercise apart from the lull in fighting which was, in fact, utilised by China to make preparations for further offensive. The Chinese leaders were veterans of the long civil war, and saw things primarily through military glasses.

The Chinese aim in advancing their 1960 claim line appears to have been to push Indians on the edge of the mountains. The Chinese thus succeeded in eliminating possible launch pads for any offensive against the Aksai Chin highway, by eliminating Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), Chushul and Demchok positions.

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China on October 24 had proposed that both sides withdraw 20 Kms from the line of control and along the frontier. This would keep the Chinese still in occupation of Aksai Chin area in Ladakh sector. India rejected it terming the Chinese proposal as unreasonable, as the Chinese had through use of force changed the ‘Line of Control’ and now wanted Indians to accept this forcible occupation.

Peiking Radio announcement in the early hours of November 21, 1962, declaring a unilateral ceasefire from mid-night of November 21-22 came as a surprise. Indian reaction was on two planes. De-facto it accepted the proposals and refrained from crossing the ‘1959’ claim line in the west and ‘1962’ Line of Actual Control’ in NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh).

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At the end of effective fighting on October 24, 1962, all forward posts established in the Chip-Chap and Nachu River valley were withdrawn. Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) was also abandoned. The Chinese had established their effective control up to their 1960 claim line. Indian troops held on to the Galwan and Shyok river junction. The Chinese also attempted to persuade the Gorkha troops that, being Nepali’s, this was not their war.

Chinese proposal for mutual withdrawal meant that India would have to withdraw her troops further 20 Kms, (inside Ladakh also) within their own territory over the whole of the eastern sector. This would have also left the Chinese in continued possession of a vast span of territory illegally occupied by them in Ladakh.