Mumbai: New Delhi was ‘utterly unaware’ of Chinese road building in the area (Aksai Chin) until September 1958, states Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) declassified papers titled ‘Polo XVI’ of the period between 1959 to 1963. According to the CIA, Chinese premier Chou En-lai had remarked that “New Delhi was ‘utterly unaware’ of this activity until September 1958 was, Chou said ‘eloquent proof that this area had indeed always been under Chinese jurisdiction and not under Indian jurisdiction.
The Aksai Chin plains were occupied since 1956. The reconnaissance parties did not recognise the road constructed. “We (India) did not think it necessary to post administrative personnel in this desolate waste land”, was the refrain of the Indian officials according to the CIA. The Americans pinned the blame on the poor state of Indian intelligence in the western sector prior to September 1958.
From 1959 onwards China began to overtly show that it felt the need for holding talks with Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to settle the border issue.
At the same time China captured a small Indian police party on a reconnaissance mission in Aksai Chin in October 1959. (The arrest of Indo Tibetan Border Force (ITBF) deputy superintendent Karam Singh and 20 of his men).
On November 12, 1959, China offered to turn over 10 Indian policemen (soldiers) captured by them and bodies of nine others. China had brainwashed them as they waved goodbye to the Chinese during their release. “The exchange was delayed until the Chinese were certain their (Indian ITBF personnel) brainwashing had been completed”.
In January 1960, the Chinese began using its Sino-Burmese border agreement as a pressure tactics against India, in a bid to force India to come to the negotiating table on its (China) terms. Just as it is now provoking communist regime in Nepal to rake up border disputes with India.
On February 5, 1960, China claimed that the entire border had never been delimited and had floated a plan for exchange of Aksai Chin plains for that of the McMahon lines. The CIA papers claim that in February and early March (1960) there were other indications that Nehru was looking for some way to accept Chinese use of the Sinkiang (now Xinjiang) – Tibet road, while retaining nominal Indian sovereignty over the Aksai Chin plains.
The British had maintained extensive administrative records (of Aksai Chin) at its India Office Library in London and published it in a detailed report available to the general public. According to a Chinese document of November 1960 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Tibet were ordered to maintain clam and estimated that New Delhi does not intend to take back areas of Chinese held border territory as Indians did not have the capability to do so.
The Tibetan revolt of March 1959, resulted in a major setback for China, as the borderland people watched the spectacle of their ethnic brothers being butchered by PLA forces.
In 1960, the Chinese experts had presented a new map to Indian experts that a new Chinese claim line which was at point well west of the map alignment of the same area which Chou En-lai had shown to Nehru in 1956, state the CIA papers. In other words it meant that the Chinese had pushed their earlier claim line of 1956 deep inside to stake claim to more of Indian territory.
Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi constantly alluded to the danger of US encirclement of China through India to then (undivided) Communist Party of India (CPI) boss Ajoy Ghosh in early 1959. China saw Nehru as a reactionary and basically anti-Communist.
According to the CIA papers China had handed down a prescription to the CPI for preventing military dominated government in India. For that the prescription was – (i). CPI efforts to develop more support for Nehru against military rightists, and (ii). Settlement of border dispute through talks which would require first proper atmosphere and then the pressure of the masses on Nehru to negotiate. On November 14, 1959 though the Communists supported India’s claim on McMahon line, however, in its important party resolution, it refrained from condemning Chinese military action in Ladakh.
Premier Chou En-lai claimed the area (Ladakh) was of great importance since Ching dynasty. Chou En-lai described regular supply runs by the PLA into Tibet from Sinkiang since 1950 and road building activity since March 1956. In the first half of his September 8, 1959 letter Chou En-lai cleverly refuted Indian contentions on the border and in the second half bemoaned that the Indians had misjudged Chinese intentions.
It presented a massive case on delimitation of traditional customary boundary line that contradicted Nehru’s claim. Chinese note of December 26 had rejected his (Chou En-lai’s) earlier contention that Chou’s 1956 statement constituted recognition of the line Nehru centered his attention on this rejection, virtually ignoring the hint. Nehru’s own advisors were largely responsible for his adamant stand, note the CIA papers.
Former Soviet Union Premier Nikita S Krushchev while referring to Soviet Union’s border agreement with Iran in which he said the Soviets had given up more land that it had gained. “What were a few kilometers for a country like the Soviet Union”, he quipped. The hint was to China on withdrawal from Aksai Chin which China turned down. Krushchev in an interview to an Indian Communist newspaper on November 7, 1959 termed the incident (Aksai Chin attack) and deplorable and stupid.
The bait of the Sino-Burmese border agreement appeared to have worked. According to the CIA papers, Nehru on February 2, 1960 announced that he had decided to meet with Chou without prior Chinese acceptance of New Delhi’s preconditions. It was only then Union Home Minister Govind Ballabh Pant alone objected.
Nehru’s reply was that there was no other alternative and that there was great pressure on India, which would appear as the recalcitrant party, if it were to reject a meeting. Actually, Nehru had decided to meet Chou at least five days prior to the announcement of the Sino-Burmese border agreement.
Meanwhile, Chinese decided to indefinitely put on hold the border agreement with Burma till its Prime Minister did not feel stimulated to demand a settlement. Burmese premier Ba Swe had openly threatened China of Burmese enmity, a thing not heard off. China cleverly showcased the border agreement with Burma as a trap to New Delhi to agree for a border settlement.
