Dhaka’s scrutiny of 101 agreements and memoranda has raised concern over Indian access to Bangladeshi ports and transit corridors. The available evidence, however, establishes a review—not the suspension of any identified arrangement.
Kolkata: Bangladesh’s decision to review 101 agreements and memoranda of understanding concluded with India has introduced fresh uncertainty into a relationship already undergoing political recalibration. For New Delhi, the immediate concern is whether the exercise could affect the ports, waterways, rail links and road corridors that connect mainland India with its Northeastern states through Bangladeshi territory.
That concern is understandable, but the evidence available so far supports a more measured conclusion. Dhaka has announced a review, yet it has not published an authoritative list of the 101 instruments or identified which ones it wants to amend, retain or discontinue. A review can lead to renegotiation, administrative changes or termination, depending on the wording and legal status of each instrument. It does not, by itself, produce any of those outcomes.
The central question is therefore narrower: where is India’s Northeast connectivity exposed if Bangladesh seeks changes, and how much protection is provided by the existing legal, commercial and institutional structure?
What Bangladesh Has Announced
Bangladesh Parliament Chief Whip Nurul Islam Moni said on September 11 that the government was reviewing 101 agreements and memoranda of understanding signed with India under the previous administration. He said the outcome would be announced after the exercise and that Bangladesh intended to maintain friendly relations while prioritising its national interests.
Moni referred specifically to arrangements involving Chattogram Port and alleged that vessels from a friendly country had received preferential treatment. He also cited an Indian-financed road which, according to him, Bangladesh had to repay with interest despite restrictions on its domestic use. These remarks raised concerns about connectivity and infrastructure, but they did not identify the underlying documents or establish the complete scope of the review.
In a subsequent reported interview, Moni said Bangladesh did not plan to cancel the agreements wholesale. Relevant ministries and departments would examine them for inconsistencies and approach India where changes were considered necessary.
India’s response has been similarly cautious. Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said on September 18 that New Delhi had seen media reports but had received no official communication from Dhaka. He added that India would take the necessary steps to protect its interests.
The present position is therefore clear on only three points: Bangladesh is conducting a review; it has not publicly released the complete list of instruments; and India had not received a formal communication about proposed changes when it responded.
Why the Type of Instrument Matters
India–Bangladesh cooperation is governed by treaties, intergovernmental agreements, memoranda of understanding, protocols, standard operating procedures, commercial contracts and project-specific financing documents. Their legal force cannot be determined solely from their titles.
Some memoranda of understanding may record political intent, while others may impose detailed obligations. Similarly, an agreement may contain termination, review or renewal clauses that determine how either government can seek changes. Commercial power contracts operate under different legal conditions from treaties between sovereign governments.
This distinction is especially important because the phrase “101 agreements and MoUs” encompasses instruments that may not share the same legal status, duration or amendment procedure. Without the official list and texts, it would be premature to claim that a specific transit corridor, energy contract or water-sharing treaty has been placed under review.
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The Ganges Treaty Is a Separate Question
The 1996 Treaty on Sharing of the Ganga/Ganges Waters at Farakka is relevant because its 30-year term is approaching completion. It should, however, be treated separately from the reported review unless Bangladesh identifies it as one of the 101 instruments.
Article II of the treaty contains the water-sharing formula for the lean season from January 1 to May 31. Article X provides for a review by the two governments at five-year intervals, or earlier if either party considers one necessary. Article XII states that the treaty will remain in force for 30 years and may be renewed by mutual consent.
Its continuation therefore requires formal bilateral engagement. The approaching end of its term makes water diplomacy an important part of the wider India–Bangladesh relationship, but it does not establish that the treaty is part of Dhaka’s administrative review.
The Architecture Supporting Northeast Connectivity
India’s access to Chattogram and Mongla ports rests on a sequence of distinct instruments. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2015, followed by an intergovernmental agreement in October 2018 and a Standard Operating Procedure in October 2019. India’s Ministry of External Affairs says the port-use agreement was operationalised in 2023.
The 2019 Standard Operating Procedure covers eight routes—four routes in both directions:
- Chattogram or Mongla Port to Agartala through Akhaura;
- Chattogram or Mongla Port to Dawki through Tamabil;
- Chattogram or Mongla Port to Sutarkandi through Sheola; and
- Chattogram or Mongla Port to Srimantpur through Bibirbazar.
These routes give Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura access to maritime gateways through Bangladesh. The Maitree Setu between Sabroom in Tripura and Ramgarh in Bangladesh is another connectivity asset, but Sabroom is discussed separately in the official Indian account and should not be presented as one of the four route pairs listed under the 2019 procedure.
The port arrangement complements the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade. The Ministry of External Affairs describes this protocol, operational since 1972, as permitting bilateral trade and transit through the river systems of India and Bangladesh. Its routes connect Indian national waterways with Bangladeshi waterways and allow cargo movement by barges and vessels.
Rail infrastructure adds another layer. The Akhaura–Agartala cross-border rail link was inaugurated in November 2023 after being built with Indian grant assistance. Its inauguration created physical rail connectivity, although that event alone should not be treated as evidence of regular freight or passenger operations at any particular frequency.
Together, these arrangements give India alternatives to moving all Northeast-bound cargo through the Siliguri Corridor. They also provide Bangladesh with port activity, transit-related revenue, logistics business and access to Indian markets.
What the Review Could Change
The most immediate risk is administrative rather than geographic. If Dhaka identifies the port-use instruments or their operating procedures for modification, it could seek changes to charges, customs requirements, permitted cargo, documentation, vehicle movement or processing rules. Such adjustments could raise logistics costs or slow cargo movement even without cancelling the underlying agreement. Their effect would depend on the terms proposed and whether bilateral consent is required.
Moni’s references to port treatment and an Indian-financed road show that infrastructure arrangements form part of Bangladesh’s political debate. They do not yet establish that Chattogram and Mongla access has been suspended or that Dhaka has formally proposed revised tariffs.
A complete withdrawal of transit access would also carry costs for Bangladesh. Port operators, transport companies, customs agencies and local businesses benefit from cargo movement. This creates an economic incentive for both governments to settle disputes through revised terms and procedures. Still, India cannot assume that economic interdependence will automatically preserve every concession. Governments can accept short-term commercial costs when domestic political pressure, sovereignty concerns or perceptions of unequal treatment become strong enough.
Trade, Energy and Development Finance
The economic relationship is substantial. According to the Ministry of External Affairs’ bilateral brief, total India–Bangladesh trade stood at $14.01 billion in the 2023–24 financial year. Bangladesh exported goods worth $1.97 billion to India. The same document describes Bangladesh as India’s largest trading partner in South Asia and India as Bangladesh’s second-largest trading partner in Asia.
Energy cooperation has also produced infrastructure that cannot be easily replaced. Bangladesh receives electricity through cross-border grid connections, while the India–Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline carries high-speed diesel into Bangladesh. The pipeline was inaugurated in March 2023 with a stated annual capacity of one million metric tonnes.
Commercial power-purchase agreements, transmission arrangements and fuel-supply infrastructure must nevertheless be distinguished from diplomatic treaties and transit protocols. A political review of bilateral arrangements would not automatically alter a commercial contract; any revision would depend on that contract’s clauses, governing law and dispute-resolution mechanism.
India has also extended four lines of credit amounting to around $8 billion for Bangladeshi infrastructure, according to the February 2024 Ministry of External Affairs brief. These cover sectors including roads, railways, shipping and ports.
Moni’s criticism of an unnamed Indian-financed road demonstrates that financing terms may attract scrutiny. It does not establish that Bangladesh has initiated a formal restructuring of the entire Indian credit portfolio. Claims about project cancellation, loan renegotiation or revised procurement conditions require project-specific evidence.
Regional Frameworks Offer Context, Not Insurance
Bilateral arrangements must also be distinguished from subregional and regional initiatives. The Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal Motor Vehicles Agreement was signed in 2015 to facilitate cross-border passenger, personal and cargo vehicle movement. In 2022, India’s Ministry of External Affairs described passenger and cargo protocols as essential for operationalising the agreement. The framework demonstrates a continuing regional interest in connectivity, but it does not guarantee the continuity of every India–Bangladesh transit arrangement.
The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, headquartered in Dhaka, provides another regional layer. Its Master Plan for Transport Connectivity remained under implementation review in 2025. Separately, the Memorandum of Understanding for Establishment of the BIMSTEC Grid Interconnection created a coordination committee, which continues to work on a master-plan study and policies for electricity transmission and trade.
These initiatives show that Bangladesh remains embedded in regional connectivity discussions. They should not be described as fully operating transport or electricity networks, or as institutional protection against bilateral disagreements.
India’s Policy Choices
India’s first requirement is documentary clarity. New Delhi needs the official list of reviewed instruments, the concerns identified by Bangladeshi ministries and the legal provisions governing amendment or termination.
Where Bangladesh raises credible concerns about tariffs, project delays, procurement conditions or unequal benefits, India has reason to negotiate. Agreements that are accepted as fair by successive governments are more likely to survive political change.
India must also continue strengthening domestic and alternative connectivity. Greater road and rail capacity through the Siliguri Corridor, completion of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project through Myanmar, improved inland-water links and better integration between Northeast logistics hubs can reduce exposure to disruptions along any single route.
These alternatives, however, differ in cost, capacity, security and operational readiness. They cannot immediately reproduce the geographic advantage of access through Bangladesh. A durable policy also requires wider political engagement in Dhaka. India’s relationships should extend across governing parties, opposition groups, state institutions, business associations and civil society. Infrastructure cooperation becomes vulnerable when it is identified too closely with one political administration.
Renegotiation, Rupture or Political Signalling?
The review has political value for Bangladesh’s new leadership. It allows the government to demonstrate scrutiny of decisions taken by its predecessor and to respond to domestic concerns about sovereignty, reciprocity and financial fairness. That does not make the exercise merely symbolic. Administrative reviews can lead to altered tariffs, delayed projects or revised operating conditions. Their strategic effect may arise through numerous procedural changes rather than a dramatic cancellation announcement.
For India, the concern is therefore real but still undefined. The available evidence does not show that Bangladesh has terminated the port-access framework, inland-water protocol, rail links or energy arrangements. It also does not establish that every existing arrangement will continue unchanged. The consequences for Northeast connectivity will depend on three developments: the instruments Bangladesh formally identifies, the modifications it proposes, and the outcome of bilateral negotiations.
Geography will continue to encourage cooperation. Bangladesh offers the shortest practical access to several parts of India’s Northeast, while Indian trade, energy supplies and development financing remain economically significant for Bangladesh. Geography, however, creates incentives; it does not settle contract terms or political disputes.
The task for both governments is to convert that mutual dependence into arrangements that can withstand changes of government. If the review produces transparent negotiations and clearer terms, it may strengthen the foundations of connectivity. If it becomes an instrument of prolonged political confrontation, the costs will be felt on both sides of the border.
