The United States sought to further include a reference as to how Tokyo and Washington should collaborate and cooperate in the defence of Taipei. However, the Japanese side preferred to be more cautious in its wording. Tokyo’s rather lukewarm attitude towards the simmering situation in the waters of the South China sea has dismayed Washington. Japan recognized the need for strategic clarity in the dispute over the Senkaku Islands to strengthen its deterrence against Chinese adventurism and sought and obtained it from the United States. However, on the point of Taiwan, Japan has resisted committing to a clear response to Chinese aggression.
@Kunal_Chonkar
New Delhi: The draft of Tokyo’s Defense White Paper for 2021 was disclosed in the second week of May. In light of Beijing’s increasingly intensifying military activities around Taiwan, the White Paper states for the first time that the ‘stability of the situation in Taiwan is important for the security of Japan and the stability of the international community.’
The paper, set to be tabled at a cabinet meeting of Tokyo in the next month expresses strong security concerns from China. In a new section focusing on relations between the United States and China that is increasingly confrontational, the paper underlines that ‘political, economic, and military rivalry between Washington and Beijing is becoming more apparent.’ It then warns that the ‘trend favours China in terms of the military power balance between the country and Taiwan’ and says that Japan will keep an eye on future trends such as the sale of weapons to Taiwan by the United States, and military exchanges between the two nations.
The paper expresses strong concerns, saying that China is relentlessly continuing its ‘unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force’ in the waters near the Senkaku Islands located in the Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture. It criticizes the assertive activities of the Chinese Coast Guard ships in Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands as a violation of international law.
Silence Strengthens Aggression
The joint statement issued after the Japanese-US summit last month clearly stated that the United States and Japan stress the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and urge a peaceful solution to cross-Strait issues.
This was the first time in 52 years, since the Sato-Nixon meeting in 1969, that Taiwan was mentioned in a Japanese-US joint statement. At the time, the statement included the phrase ‘the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan region is an extremely important element for Japan’s security.’ In contrast, the wording this time is even more operational. In reality, it appears that the United States sought to further include a reference as to how Tokyo and Washington should collaborate and cooperate in the defence of Taipei. However, the Japanese side preferred to be more cautious in its wording.
Members of the strategic community in Washington are dismayed by Tokyo’s rather lukewarm attitude towards the simmering situation in the waters of the South China sea. In the context of this development, former director of Pentagon’s China Division Joseph Bosco was quoted as saying that ‘Japan recognized the need for strategic clarity in the Senkakus to strengthen its deterrence against Chinese adventurism and sought and obtained it from the United States. On the point of Taiwan, however, Japan has resisted committing to a clear response to Chinese aggression. Such ‘ambiguity’ will further embolden China.’
Since the administration of US President Richard Nixon, which sought to counter the Soviet Union by seeking closer ties with China, successive administrations in Washington have fundamentally followed a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity over the Taiwan Strait.
This ‘strategic ‘ambiguity’ is intended to simultaneously deter both Taiwan’s declaration of independence and China’s campaign of forced reunification by not clarifying whether the United States would rush to Taipei to provide support if Beijing launched a military attack.
In the mid-1990s, China launched missiles ahead of Taiwan’s Presidential election, threatening Taipei. At that time, when asked what Washington would do against Beijing if it invaded Taipei, a senior Clinton administration official was quoted as saying ‘we do not know. You do not know either. It all depends on the situation.’ Those words signify the ‘strategic ‘ambiguity.’
Ambiguity To Clarity
However, the effectiveness of this ‘strategic ambiguity’ has been questioned by the strategic community. Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations in an article in 2020, argued that the ‘strategic ambiguity’ is making it more difficult to deter China, which is rapidly increasing its military capabilities and becoming more aggressive.’ That being the case, he added that ‘It is time for the United States to introduce a policy of strategic clarity.’ Haass recommended that ‘Washington needs to strengthen its naval and air force in the region, deploy them in a decentralized manner, step up the priority of the Department of Defense’s strategic planning in the case of a Taipei contingency, and discuss with Tokyo and Seoul about what their roles should be and what support they should provide.’
However, Tokyo’s strategic community cites that a tactical shift from ‘strategic ambiguity’ to ‘strategic clarity’ in Taipei could have pitfalls. According to prominent media commentaries and articles in Japan, at first hand, the shift to ‘strategic clarity’ brings a risk that of China overreacting and stepping up the military expansion race in the region.
Secondly, if this ‘strategic clarity’ is presented and perceived as a ‘red line,’ then adherence to it could become a litmus test for Washington’s credibility and the United States under the Biden administration may fall into a ‘red line trap.’ Furthermore, the concept of ‘clarity is hardly useful in grey-zone situations such as geo-economic challenges including cyberattacks and supply-chain disruptions, or battles for political influence using social networking sites. Thus, there is a hankering to apply ‘deceptive planning’ to counter the ‘deception tactics’ of the mainland.
Taipei’s Strategic Value
Analysts are at crossroads over Beijing’s ability to invade Taipei and the quality of its operations. As per the report of Michael Beckley, China will not be able to take down Taiwan easily with landing operations, a maritime blockade, or strategic bombing. Taiwan might proceed with a ‘porcupine strategy,’ with a scenario of prolonging the struggle while waiting for support from Washington.
Still, Taipei, under the leadership of President Tsai Ing-Wen, has undoubtedly more than ever before emerged as a nation with far greater strategic value for both Tokyo and Washington with Beijing’s increasing efforts to seize control of the Indo-Pacific waters. Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and Okinawa are located at the pivotal point of the first island chain. In the event of a Taiwan contingency, the Senkaku Islands and Okinawa may be facing an ‘existential crisis,’ a requirement for exercising its right of collective self-defence. Or, if Taipei were to be lost, Washington would no longer be able to maintain the first island defence line, which it now hopes to cement with the Coast Guard cooperation between the two nations. This would spell the end of Washington’s position and influence as in the Western Pacific. Both the Japanese-US alliance and the defence of Japan’s sea lanes will face a critical situation. During the Pacific War, General Douglas MacArthur described Taiwan as an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ overlooking the South China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the East China Sea, and this geopolitical position has not changed to date.
Japan – Australia’s 2+2 Meeting on China
Meanwhile, reports indicate that Canberra and Tokyo are coordinating to hold an online ministerial dialogue of foreign and defence ministers (2+2) on 9 June. Analysts suggested that after confirming cooperation for the realization of “a free and open Indo-Pacific,’ both countries are now aiming to restrain Beijing’s aggressive rudder in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
Sources claimed that the ‘2+2’ meeting will stage discussions for the early signing of a ‘facilitation agreement’ that establishes the legal status of the ‘Self-Defense Forces and the Australian military during mutual visits.’ The agreement is equivalent to the ‘Status of Forces Agreement’ of the United States Forces with Japan and was generally agreed at the Japan-Australia summit meeting in November 2020. The two governments also exchanged views on ‘weapon protection’ in which the ‘Self-Defense Forces’ guard Australian ships and aircraft. Beijing’s controversial ‘Coast Guard Law’ which clearly states the authority to use weapons by the Chinese Coast Guard, is also expected to be on the agenda radar.
