Mumbai : India has a Model Code of Conduct for political parties and candidates. It sets standards for those seeking the people’s mandate and is enforced by the Election Commission of India. But there is a curious asymmetry. We have a code governing the conduct of those who contest elections. What governs the manner in which the institution conducting those elections exercises its own considerable powers? That is not an argument for weakening the Election Commission or subjecting its decisions to day-to-day judicial supervision. An institution entrusted with the superintendence, direction and control of elections must have considerable discretion.
The question is different: could the constitutional and administrative principles governing the exercise of that discretion be articulated more clearly and systematically? Perhaps the time has come for the Supreme Court, in cases properly before it, to consider whether existing principles can be brought together and clarified in the context of the Commission’s powers.
Why the SIR experience matters
The recent Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls illustrates why that question matters. The Supreme Court, in its May 27, 2026 judgment on the Bihar SIR, upheld the Election Commission’s power to undertake the exercise under Article 324 of the Constitution read with Section 21(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, and held that the exercise was founded on a legitimate purpose. Electoral rolls must be kept accurate, and the Commission needs the authority to verify entries, remove ineligible names and correct errors. But exercises of this scale also demonstrate why the manner in which such powers are exercised matters as much as the existence of the power itself.
The distinction between omission and exclusion is important. Omission means that a name is absent from the roll; exclusion implies a determination that the person should not be included. An omitted name may result from a failure to complete a required process, a documentation issue or an administrative error. It does not, by itself, establish ineligibility. The Bihar SIR brought this distinction into sharp focus. Nearly 65 lakh electors were not included in the draft roll following non-submission of enumeration forms. The Supreme Court subsequently directed that the names of those left out, along with the reasons for their non-inclusion, be published and that affected persons be given an opportunity to file claims.
The significance lies not in whether electoral rolls should be revised, but in whether a process with such significant consequences provides a meaningful means of identifying and correcting wrongful omissions. Goa presented a different problem. The Indian Express reported that 97 voters found eligible by local Electoral Registration Officers remained absent from the final roll because the centralised ECINet software did not permit the earlier decisions to be reversed. The Goa Chief Electoral Officer subsequently said that many had been enrolled and the remaining cases were being processed. Here, the concern was whether the administrative system could accommodate a correction once an authorised officer had determined that a person was eligible.
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The two examples involve different problems, but they point to the same underlying question: when the Commission exercises consequential electoral powers, are the principles governing that exercise sufficiently clear to ensure legality, fairness, transparency and accountability?
We regulate the contestants. Who regulates the referee?
The irony is difficult to miss. Political parties are expected to explain their conduct. Candidates can be called upon to account for violations. Campaign expenditure is subject to scrutiny. Election advertisements are regulated. The Model Code of Conduct prescribes standards of behaviour. But there is no equivalent, publicly articulated framework setting out, in one place, how the Election Commission should ordinarily exercise its considerable powers. Of course, the Commission is subject to the Constitution, legislation, regulations, its own procedures and judicial review. The point is narrower: these sources establish the legal framework within which the Commission operates, but do not necessarily provide a single, readily understood account of how consequential discretionary powers should ordinarily be exercised.
The distinction is between the existence of power and the principles governing its exercise.
What might such a framework contain?
The phrase “model code” should not be misunderstood. This is not a proposal for the Supreme Court to write an administrative rulebook for the Election Commission or to supervise its day-to-day functioning. The narrower proposition is that, through cases properly before it, the Court might bring greater clarity to the constitutional principles that already govern the exercise of public power and consider how they apply to the Commission’s existing powers. Some of those principles are familiar.
Legality requires every exercise of public power to have a constitutional or statutory foundation. Article 324 gives the Commission wide powers, but it is not a licence to act contrary to legislation.
Non-arbitrariness requires decisions to rest on identifiable legal and factual grounds rather than unexplained or inconsistent standards.
Equality requires similarly situated persons to be treated alike, while allowing objectively defensible distinctions where circumstances materially differ.
Procedural fairness becomes particularly important where an administrative decision can materially affect a person’s electoral rights. There should ordinarily be a meaningful opportunity to establish eligibility, correct an error or challenge an adverse determination.
Proportionality requires measures affecting important rights to bear a reasonable relationship to the legitimate constitutional purpose they are intended to serve.
Reasons matter because a consequential decision should ordinarily be intelligible to those affected and capable of meaningful judicial review.
And technology cannot displace institutional responsibility. Software may implement an administrative process, but it cannot become a substitute for the legal judgment of the authority responsible for that process.
None of these are novel propositions. They are established features of constitutional and administrative law. The question is whether their application to electoral administration can be made sufficiently clear to guide the exercise of significant powers.
Transparency is not the same as publicity
The Election Commission cannot reasonably be expected to respond to every political allegation, social-media controversy or criticism directed at it. But where a decision has significant consequences, there is a strong case for explaining its basis. A reasoned decision serves several purposes. It allows citizens to understand what has been decided and why. It enables an affected person to challenge the decision on the facts or the law. And it allows a reviewing court to examine the reasoning rather than merely the outcome. Transparency, in this context, is not publicity.
It is making the exercise of public power intelligible.
But who should set these standards?
This is where constitutional caution is necessary. The Supreme Court should not become an alternative Election Commission. It should not supervise electoral administration, approve decisions in advance, investigate every complaint or substitute its administrative preferences for those of the Commission. Its constitutional role is different: to interpret the Constitution and the law, resolve concrete disputes and determine whether public power has remained within legal and constitutional limits. Through that process, however, the Court can clarify principles that may guide the exercise of such power in future cases.
The Court would not be telling the Commission what to decide. It would be clarifying the constitutional principles within which the Commission must exercise its judgment.
That distinction matters. Elections involve changing circumstances, competing interests and practical problems that cannot always be anticipated in advance. The Commission therefore needs room to exercise judgment. A constitutional framework should establish boundaries, not prescribe administrative outcomes.
Independence should not mean insulation
The independence of the Election Commission is essential. It must be able to perform its constitutional responsibilities without partisan pressure or interference. But independence from political influence is not the same as immunity from legal scrutiny. Indeed, clearly understood constitutional standards could strengthen institutional independence. They would provide a framework within which the Commission could exercise discretion while making clear that its decisions remain subject to law. The Commission would continue to administer elections. The courts would continue to adjudicate constitutional and legal questions. The two roles need not compete.
The larger principle
The examples arising from electoral-roll revision are not arguments against the Commission’s power to undertake such exercises. That power is necessary to maintain accurate electoral rolls. The larger question is about the manner in which consequential public power is exercised. This extends well beyond electoral-roll revision. The Election Commission takes decisions affecting candidates, political parties, campaign conduct, electoral schedules, voting procedures and the administration of elections themselves. The greater the consequence of an exercise of public power, the greater the importance of clear legal standards, fair procedures and intelligible reasoning. That is not a demand for judicial management of elections.
It is a demand for constitutional clarity.
The question worth asking
The Election Commission rightly expects political parties and candidates to understand that the integrity of the electoral process matters. The same principle applies to the institution that administers that process. Perhaps the time has come for the Supreme Court, through an appropriate case, to consider whether the constitutional principles governing the Commission’s exercise of power can be clarified and brought together more systematically. The Court may ultimately conclude that no further articulation is necessary. That too would be a legitimate constitutional conclusion. But the question is worth asking. If those who participate in elections are expected to operate within clearly understood standards of conduct, it is reasonable to ask whether the institution administering those elections should exercise its considerable powers within equally clear constitutional boundaries.
The greater the power, the greater the obligation to explain how it was exercised.
