@bhavnasingh984
New Delhi: China’s desire to achieve global dominance reflected in its BRI initiative is not exactly a sombre ambition as is evident in its foray into the Indian Ocean over the last few years. However, the US desire to check what China is doing in the Indian Ocean and the nearby Pacific region has been equally strong. This has led to the official recognition by the US of the Indian role in the region in 2019, and also fleetingly earlier in 2017 when they outlined the definition of the Indo-Pacific in the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR). This not only shows the shift in the US understanding (from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific) of India’s role but is an indicator of the growing threat of China’s dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.
China’s revisionist streaks can be witnessed in the establishment of several new multilateral organizations like the BRICS-Plus, SCO, RIC, MGC, China-ASEAN cooperation which have sought to renounce US claims on the South Asian region. But with smaller initiatives like the QUAD and the US-ASEAN cooperation gaining traction and the renaming of the U.S. Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command’, China’s worries about dominance have become more pronounced. Though the US’ delegation of authority to India has also not been free-handed; US VP Mike Pence announced that the US was willing to invest around 60 billion dollars for the development along the Indo-Pacific but only with a lot of caveats.
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Initially the Chinese even tried to dismiss the QUAD and the Indo-Pacific construct by calling it ‘sea foam’ which deserved only a nonchalant glance. But over the years the Chinese have attuned themselves to the resistance faced by the BRI and the growth of sub-regional entities as a challenge to China’s hegemony. Jin Canrong, an influential scholar from Renmin University in Beijing, went as far as to describe the Indo-Pacific as a ‘bubble’ that will disappear as soon as the sun shines. They showed much overconfidence in feeling that China had adequate strategic space to navigate the treacherous waters of the Indo-Pacific. Of late, the Chinese have even changed their position and embraced India’s role in the Indo-Pacific region to inhibit India from completely aligning with the US. Many believe it to be a continuation of Obama’s rebalancing strategy and an expansion of the QUAD. Nonetheless, the Chinese have demonstrated a stronger resolve to build Chin as a naval power and already view itself as an established continental power.
The caveat, however, remains that the middle powers such as Australia, Japan and India do not want the Indo-Pacific to be defined by US-China rivalry. Smaller Southeast Asian nations generally play safe in the shadow of Sino-US competition and their main concern is to ensure secure Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCS).
Thus any intervention by China in the Malacca straits or the South China Sea is seen with suspicion amongst these smaller nations. With border tensions that flared up in 2020, India began engaging with agreements that seemed anti-China. This resulted in the commencement of the trilateral Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) which could play an important role in the naval strategic sphere that is going to emerge.
There is certain geography that plays to China’s disadvantage. First, China is not exactly a Pacific country. Second, there are no historical ties that China can boast of in the Indo-Pacific unlike the centuries-old business community settlements in small nations like Fiji that India enjoys. Moreover, smaller nations like New Zealand aspire “Collective solutions to shared challenges in the Pacific require strong and vibrant regionalism, with institutions that can convert political will into action, supported by partners who align their efforts with the region’s priorities”, which means any expansionist designs of China are not welcome in the Pacific waters.
As the region grows in population and economic weight, there are bound to be frictions in pursuit of a more expansive set of political, economic and security interests. Since China’s militarization streak in the South China Sea is quite strong, it is only palpable that it will seek regional hege, money in the near-term even in this region and try to realize its dream of global dominance in the long-term.
China’s aspiration could be realized even at the cost of regional peace and flouting global legal norms which are jettisoned by its military ascendance. In 2018, China’s placement of anti-ship cruise missiles and long-range surface-to-air missiles on the disputed Spratly Islands violated a 2015 public pledge by the Chairman of the CCP Xi Jinping that “China does not intend to pursue militarization” of the Spratly Islands.
China is also using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to comply with its agenda. These incidents showcase that China is largely seen as an aggressor country amongst the Pacific nations. Neither history nor geography is favourable to China’s aspiration to dominate the Indo-Pacific and yet its ambition to make a clear footprint in the Indian Ocean region and the Indo-Pacific region remains unrelenting. It thus depends largely on China’s international behaviour and its ability to tone down its aggression amongst regional neighbours how the narrative on its Indo-Pacific dream may shape up.
Dr Bhavna Singh is an Independent China Analyst and the author of China’s Discursive Nationalism
