Bangladesh’s Retaliation to China’s Uyghur Policy

Irrespective of the fact that China is now Bangladesh’s top trading partner, direct foreign investor, trade importer, and military hardware supplier

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While most South Asian countries prefer to stay silent on China’s handling of its human rights issues regarding Uyghurs, Bangladesh (BD) vocalises its dissent, both through formal institutions and through its civil society groups. The Chinese government has reportedly detained more than a million Muslims in re-education camps, resulting in violations of human rights and creating angst among Muslims across several communities. While the number of detainees is misleading, there is a need to assess why Bangladesh is assertive about this issue and the other South Asian countries are not. The attempt here is to look at Bangladesh’s evolving posture towards China’s Uyghur policy and how their interests differ.

In August 2020, Bangladesh witnessed a protest outside the Dhaka Press Club against Chinese brutality and suppression of Uyghur Muslims. The event was observed as a token of support for Uyghur Muslims to mark the occasion of Independence Day of ‘the Islamic Republic of East Turkestan’, which is observed worldwide on November 12. In March 2021, leaders of several Islamist groups in Bangladesh called for a boycott of Chinese goods unless China reverses its policy towards Uyghur Muslims. Again in May 2021, the Human Rights Protection Council of Sylhet held protests across Bangladesh against the persecution of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang and to mark Doppa Day, the festival celebrated by the people of this ethnic group.

A Uyghur man works at his shop in Kashgar in the Xinjiang region

Doppa Day

Organisations in Bangladesh marked the festival by distributing pamphlets and putting up posters depicting the harsh treatment meted out to Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities by the Chinese government. The protests were intended to demand the lifting of the ban on Doppa caps that symbolise the traditions of the Uyghur Muslims, a ban on the systematic repression of the Uyghurs, the abolition of forced abortions, and the release of Uyghurs from internment camps. Many of the detainees at the internment camps complained of torture, rape, and forced labour. They had mostly been working in the textile factories and picking cotton.

Why do Bangladesh resist?

The main reason seems to be its Islamic connection. A pre-protest rally speech by Mufti Fakhrul Islan, Chairman of the Public Service Movement in Bangladesh, indicated that if the Chinese government did not yield to the basic human rights of the Muslims, there could be larger implications in terms of invoking the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, unlike Sri Lanka and Pakistan, which have become debt-ridden by loans from China, Bangladesh has a strong economic base independent of China and has even rejected several Chinese overtures over the last decade when they did not suit its economic interests. Hence, Bangladesh does not feel hesitant to vocalise its dissent against China’s Uyghur policy.

Beijing launched a brutal crackdown that has swept more than 1 million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslim minorities into detention camps and prisons in its western Xinjiang Province under the pretext of fighting Islamist extremism.

Historical reasons due to a lack of China’s support for Bangladesh’s independence in the face of supporting Pakistan could also be at the heart of Bangladesh’s cautious approach to China. Bangladesh has even shown retaliation at various levels. For example, the Chinese ambassador was threatened with being expelled from Bangladesh, and Chinese businesses were cautioned against possible closing down. Even now, there is a possibility of instigating riots along Chinese settlement colonies, and Bangladesh is even threatening to cull defence deals with China. In addition, pro-democracy elements are being strengthened through international intervention on behalf of Uyghurs, for instance Bangladesh’s support for the UNHCR.

This is in stark contrast to the stand taken by other south Asian countries like Pakistan, which delivered a joint statement on September 26, 2022, on behalf of nearly 70 countries at the 51st session of the Human Rights Council. The statement pointed out that Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet-related issues are China’s internal affairs and expressed opposition to politicisation of human rights and double standards, or interference in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of human rights. In addition to this statement, representatives from more than 20 countries also spoke out separately to support China. Most other south Asian countries, like Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, also continue to support China or at least do not voice dissent as far as its internal matters are concerned.

A Uighur man at a temperature checkpoint in Kuqa, China, on June 29, 2020

Irrespective of the fact that China is now Bangladesh’s top trading partner, direct foreign investor, trade importer, and military hardware supplier, Bangladesh remains antithetical to China’s Uyghur policy. Though Bangladesh has shown support for the Belt and Road Initiative, ahead of its expected joining of the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade deal, Dhaka has not seen any significant financial support from Beijing on the Rohingya issue, for which the US has provided at least USD 1.6 billion since 2017 to deal with the refugee crisis. Like Bangladesh, human rights groups across several countries have urged their governments to follow the lead of the US and several other Western countries. 

Notwithstanding, China has been successful at thwarting attempts to raise questions about its Uyghur policy, including the rejection by the UNHRC of holding a debate on China’s human rights record in the Xinjiang region. While the democratic countries will continue to support reform and action against China’s Uyghur policy, it is interesting to see how Bangladesh is challenging China’s authoritarian narrative about its Uyghur community. Though some negotiations to gain political accommodation could be seen in the future as the relations will continue to be marked by realpolitik, which includes a delicate balancing act by Bangladesh.

(The author, Dr. Bhavna Singh, is a senior research scholar at Shaanxi Normal University, Xian, PRC. She can be reached through email at bhavna.singh984@gmail.com).

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