Mumbai: According to the declassified papers of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) titled Polo XVI, China absorbed continuous volley of insults and rebuffs without striking back publicly, calculating that a public riposte would compel Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to leave the dispute open indefinitely.
“The self-defeating aspect of the Chinese policy was to press Nehru in various clever ways, but to offer him no concessions. They were therefore left with sticks of various sizes and when they used even a small one the Indians winced. Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) secretary general, R K Nehru was scolded like a small boy by Chairman, People’s Republic of China (PRC), Liu Shao-chi in July 1961 for coming to China only to demand Chinese withdrawal and to insist that the border had been delimited”, state the CIA papers.
The Chinese were alert to the moves of the Indian troops from 1957 to 1960 and had done so without detection. Lieutenant General B M Kaul had directed moves to increase forces in the border. Indians could not move forward.
On November 30, 1961, China tried to warn Prime Minister Nehru that it would have every reason to cross the so-called McMahon line in the east. The warning failed to deter Nehru. The June 1962, Indian advances behind People’s Liberation Army (PLA) posts convinced China that they should prepare for a major operation. However, Krishna Menon discounted probability of significant Chinese retaliatory action even after the October 10, 1961 fire fight that left 33 Chinese dead near Dhola.
All this while China tried to exploit its treaty with Burma to support their unwarranted claim for negotiating the question of India-China boundary. China preferred that New Delhi stopped quarreling about “snowy mountainous territory that is probably inhabited only by animals”.
Government of India on the other hand pointed out repeatedly and in clear unmistakable terms that this boundary is well known and well recognised and has been so for centuries and cannot be subject of any negotiations.
Liu Shao-chi demanded that if New Delhi wanted the Plain (Aksai Chin) vacated before starting negotiations, the Indians must vacate the NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) and this was the “only conditions on which China could consider even talking about the Plain (Aksai Chin).
All this while China had stealthily made advances from 1957 to 1960, whereas it provided India justification to do so only in 1961. China objected to Indian troops moving on Indian soil at Kargo and Charding la and to six posts, including one at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO). China denied any new posts in the area, whereas India made error in post coordinates that put new posts within its own territory.
The border dispute was in this way transformed from a primarily political quarrel to a serious military confrontation. In July 1962, India had no other plans to counter Chinese encirclement of Indian posts. The strategy of Indian leadership was that they hoped, China would go away, state the CIA papers.
Krishna Menon continued to favor soft line of talks, but had no real powers. Indian army leaders did not share Menon’s views. Indian could never establish a supply line comparable to China in Aksai Chin. Chinese were either unaware of the civilian-army policy dichotomy in India.
Chinese Foreign Minister, Cheng Yi stated publicly on August 3, 1962 that, regarding a Chinese withdrawal from Ladakh, “no force in the world could oblige us to do something of this kind” and Peiping declared that the preconditions must be dropped.
China continued to harp on no preconditions for talks. Prime Minister Nehru had been waiting for a straw to grasp, he did not find one nor did the Chinese indicate privately to him that one could be found.
In retrospect, R K Nehru’s and Krishna Menon’s increasing awareness that Indian posts could not be moved any further forward and were in fact highly vulnerable to Chinese attack, spurred them to press the Prime Minister for negotiations. They recognised that a military catastrophe was probable and that such a development would hurt them politically.
If the civilian leaders had been permitted to pursue their course, the border dispute might have been turned away in August 1962 from a military clash and towards a political settlement. However, in addition to Chinese intransigence and domestic opposition, a major military development on the border in the east at last locked the door which had just been closed on such a settlement.
Domestic politicians and journalists in effect had assisted the army leaders in destroying Menon’s flexible line. The press had to a “considerable extent” tied the hands of Indian diplomats in dealing with the Chinese.
On September 24, 1962 Indians spotted large scale movement of vehicles carrying stores and equipment continued to arrive at forward posts in the western sector, but interpreted these moves as indicating the Chinese were stretching their posts “for the winter”. Indian leaders were reluctant to take the Chinese threats of full scale war seriously, state the CIA papers. Chinese had been alert to the Indian troop move ups since 1961.
The People’s Daily editorial on October 14, 1962 implied retaliation in the eastern sector. This was deceptive as the Chinese opened attack on the western sector on October 20, 1962, surprising Indian forces in the relatively less active area.
On February 17, 1963, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi while talking to a Swedish journalist was at great pains to deny that the great advances made by PLA forces southwards after October 20, 1962 was more than a mere counter attack against Indian actions in the localized Dhola area. He tried to lend credibility to his lie by conceding that of course China had “prepared” but preferred only a defence.
Chinese threats and warnings were made over such a long time since 1961, November that their import was diluted in the West and India. In the crucial warning period from mid-September to mid-October 1962 when China began using stronger language, Indians viewed Peiping’s threats as more of the same.
On October 13, 1962, Indian officials speaking to US officials discounted the possibility of Chinese extensive military operations as reaction to India’s operation in Dhola area. The CIA papers note the Chinese view as “Indians had to be taught a lesson which meant simply that they must begin to recognise realistically their military inferiority.
Chou En-lai had even remarked that Indian troops were not even qualified to be called as “bean-curd” soldiers. One Chinese platoon capturing two Indian battalions along with their equipment.
In respect of Chinese holding talks with Pakistan over the disputed boundary areas of Kashmir was to put pressure on India for talks. The Chinese had then toed a Soviet Union line that talks with Karachi were “first steps” towards leading Pakistan out of the Western alliance. After China felt that US had warmed up to India’s Non Aligned policy. Today, Pakistan tilting so heavily towards China for all weather support and China investing so heavily into Pakistan only highlights what China had been up to since 1950, so reveal the CIA papers.
